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I. 
Naturalism means many different things to many different people.  The variety of it that I am 
concerned with here goes something like this:  “It is an illegitimate pretension of philosophy that 
it can present “orders” to science.  Metaphysicians think that they can tell science what the limits 
are of acceptable ontologies.  Epistemologists believe that they can provide science with the 
appropriate rules for accepting and rejecting hypotheses.  And philosophers of language claim to 
tell the scientists what the bounds of meaningful discourse are and how the scientist’s concepts 
accrue their meanings.  But insofar as these philosophers pretend to base their own assertions on 
reasoning that is itself outside the bounds of science and that is prior to science, they live a life of 
illusion.  There simply is not and cannot be a “first philosophy” that can find its grounds outside 
the conclusions of the best available science and that can dictate to the sciences from a higher 
standpoint. 
 
To believe in first philosophy, it is claimed, is not only to fall into illusion.  It is to maintain a 
position that throws roadblocks into the path of progressive science.  Time and time again, it is 
said, we see the pretensions of philosophy being used to impede the advance of science. 
 
For an alleged example:  Cartesian philosophy demanded that our physical concepts eschew 
those referring to “occult” causal powers, that all causation proceed continuously in space and 
that all spatio-temporal relationships be framed in terms of the spatial and temporal relations 
among things and events.  But Newton invokes the latent potentiality of all matter to attract all 
matter.  Worse yet, it appears, at least on the surface, as though this gravitational attraction 
amounts to causal interaction at a distance.  Still worse, it is Newton’s famous claim that the 
basic laws of dynamics require the positing of absolute reference frames for rest and motion and 
absolute scales of temporal congruence which, for Newton, imply the falsehood of a relationistic 
account of space and time.  For how many decades did a prioristic Cartesian metaphysics impede 
the full acceptance of the Newtonian scheme despite the latter’s astounding scientific success? 
 
Here is another alleged example:  With the acceptance of the Newtonian program, it soon 
became a philosophical theme that many aspects of the new world-view (now thought of as the 
“mechanical” view although that term was once reserved for Cartesianism) were establishable as 
a priori philosophical principles.  For an example there is the fact that Kant comes awfully close 
to trying to establish Newtonian dynamics and gravitational theory as a priori in his 
Metaphysical Foundations.  Some of the Energeticists, especially Duhem, would claim in the 
nineteenth century that it was just this metaphysical a priorism that was leading scientists down 
the garden path of trying to discover mechanical models of the aether, instead of simply 
formulating the general, abstract phenomenological laws of electricity and magnetism as an 
autonomous discipline of physics. 
 
Others would probably claim that philosophical a priorism in the guise of claims to demonstrate 
the universality of causation (Leibniz on sufficient reason, Kant on universal causation) stood in 
the way of many who ought to have immediately and enthusiastically welcomed quantum 
mechanics, even if that theory seemed to reject such universal causation.  Indeed, even the great 
Einstein, it is argued, may have suffered from the perils to taking first philosophy too seriously. 
 
Within philosophy attacks on first philosophy are often taken up by philosophers who can 
broadly be labeled “empiricists.”  It was, after all, Hume who first starts telling us about the 
“sophistry and illusion” that traditional metaphysics amounts to, but who, at the same time, 
espouses so many of the typical empiricist themes:  immediate contents of sensation, the accrual 
of meaning by ostensive definition, generalization from experience by induction alone, the 
rejection of intelligibility to that which refers to what allegedly outruns the possibility of 
epistemic access, and so on. 
 
But the naturalists I am concerned with are adamant that empiricism itself is just one more 
example of first philosophy run riot.  Like any other first philosophy it establishes its theses on 
grounds that do not really advert to any contents of the best available scientific description of the 
world.  And like any other first philosophy it is just as subject to claims of total illegitimacy.  
(Do we commit the Enquiry to the flames?  It certainly doesn’t look like a logic text, or a treatise 
on inductive science.  Can we really climb Wittgensteinian ladders that actually don’t exist?) 
 
Worse yet, empiricism commits the same heinous crime of which the other first philosophies are 
convicted.  It stands in the way of scientific progress. 
 
Consider the claims of some cognitive psychologists that it was radical empiricist 
presuppositions that led not only to philosophical logical behaviorism, but to the psychological 
methodology of behaviorism that for so long impeded the progress of a full-blooded cognitive 
psychology, a psychology that legitimately posited such things as internal mental representations 
in its explanations of externally observable behavior. 
 
Or again:  Although the Energeticists claimed that it was mechanism promoted to the rank of 
first philosophy that impeded science by leading many distinguished researchers onto the time 
wasting path of a search for a mechanical model of the aether, one could also claim that it was 
the Energeticist’s own empiricist first philosophy that came close to impeding the development 
of one of the late nineteenth century’s greatest scientific accomplishments, the kinetic theory of 
gases.  Empiricism led some to anti-atomism in a time when the positing of atoms was supported 
only in a very indirect manner by the laws of chemical combination and by the, then highly 
speculative, atomic and kinetic theory of heat.  There are, indeed, those who claim that 
Boltzmann’s unfortunate depression and eventual suicide were at least in part brought on by his 
fear that the scientific community would neglect his work because of the philosophically 
motivated objections to it launched by Duhem and others.  Even if anti-atomism hardly held up 
the progress of science at all (or for very long), wouldn’t that be crime enough if it were 
legitimate to attribute the anti-atomists stance to an a prioristic empiricism adopted as first 
philosophy? 
 
If all first philosophy, empiricism included, is not only of dubious legitimacy but also bears the 
strong potential of standing in the way of scientific progress when taken seriously, why not do 
without it entirely?  One way to de-fang its pretensions might be to reduce its claims to a 
“manner of speaking” or a “conventionally adopted framework.”  Then one could still talk in a 
philosophical vein, but would have to always keep in mind that any of the alternative ways of 
talking would function equally well.  But even that approach has been subject to claims that it 
has its own a priorism, at least to the extent that it thinks it can distinguish the merely 
conventional ways of talking from the contentful assertions internal to science itself. 
 
Why not, instead, just eschew anything like first philosophy altogether.  “Let science be 
science.”  And insofar as there are terms such as ‘metaphysics,’ ‘epistemology,’ or ‘philosophy 
of language,’ let them be nothing but, at best, honorifics applied to particularly large, deep or 
especially interesting bodies of the conclusions of science itself.  Insofar as we can ask 
philosophical questions at all, their answers are to be sought in what our best available science 
tells us about the nature of the world.  And if we feel that science could never answer some 
philosophical question or other, we ought to reflect on what is either on our part an antecedent 
limitation upon our conception about what science might be, or a failure on our part to really 
have in mind a question whose import we truly understand. 
 
If it is issues of epistemology or of philosophy of language that we have in mind, then, 
presumably, many of the “mental,” or psychological, or social or linguistic sciences would be 
needed to properly deal with the questions asked.  But what if our questions are questions of 
metaphysics?  Well, insofar as things like the mind-body problem are metaphysical, presumably 
there too everything the neurologist and psychologist could tell us about “mind” would be 
relevant to answering the questions.  But if the metaphysical questions are questions about the 
fundamental stuff of the world, including the world of the non-mental, then surely physics, 
indeed foundational physics, is the place to look for the scientific answers to the questions.  
Indeed, one prominent line has it that even if it is such questions as the existence of abstract 
objects – universals or sets or numbers – that is in metaphysical question, the answers are to be 
found in foundational physics.  What exists is what foundational physics says exists or what 
foundational physics presupposes as existing (modulo such emergent things as minds). 
 
II. 
There could be a host of reasons for challenging this “naturalistic” proposal.  But there is only 
one such objection that I will be concerned with here.  We are to take as that which exists that 
which our fundamental physical theories tell us exists, or, perhaps, that whose existence these 
theories must presuppose in order to be true.  But does a fundamental theory ever really tell us 
what exists – according to its own lights?  The problem I am concerned with here is this:  All of 
the fundamental physical theories I know about are subject to multiple interpretations.  And what 
there is in the world according to one of these interpretations is very often not what there is in the 
world according to some other of these interpretations. 
 
Why are there manifold interpretations of these fundamental theories?  Here I am not concerned 
with the game that one can play by ignoring the science altogether and simply reformulating the 
theory in various ways according to some Carnapian framework manipulation.  It is not, say, that 
we can substitute n-tuples of numbers for spacetime points, say, that is bothering me here.  The 
interpretations I am concerned with, rather, are those that arise out of debates within the 
scientific community over how to understand exactly what some fundamental theory or other is 
telling us about the nature of the world. 
 
These debates are always driven by specific problematic aspects of the fundamental theories 
themselves.  It is out of the internal difficulties presented by the theories that the interpretive 
debates arise.  Each and every fundamental physical theory that I know of has been born with 
such puzzling and problematic aspects.  It is in trying to ease the puzzlement and resolve the 
problems within science that the multiplicity of interpretations are proposed. 
 
Should classical dynamics be interpreted in the form that uses Newton’s absolute space and 
time?  Or, rather, should it be interpreted using what is called Galilean or neo-Newtonian 
spacetime?  Or instead of these should it be reformulated to use only spatio-temporal relations as 
in its Machian versions?  Should force be taken as a primitive in the theory, as Euler and Daniel 
Bernoulli believed?  Or should it be eliminated from the theory entirely as many since 
D'Alembert have proposed?  Should the accompanying gravitational theory be understood as 
positing action at a distance?  Or should that theory be taken as merely a temporary expedient to 
be replaced by a field theory?  Or, to mention another alternative once proposed by Hertz, should 
it be viewed as expressing a constraint imposed on visible matter by the configuration and 
motion of an invisible aether? 
 
This variety of interpretations does not disappear with the transition to the special and general 
theories of relativity, for these too can be viewed from the perspective of a multiplicity of 
viewpoints.  Indeed, many of the old arguments about how to understand the Newtonian theory 
reappear, sometimes subtly transformed, in interpretive debates about the relativistic theories. 
 
Quantum mechanics, of course, is notorious for generating interpretive controversy.  Should it be 
understood in the quasi-instrumentalistic version of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation?  Or 
should it be understood from the violently opposed point of view of Bohm’s theory of 
determinate particle positions and “pilot waves” with instantaneous action at a distance?  Or 
must we revert to idealism to understand the theory as Wigner insisted?  Or, instead, is the theory 
telling us about a universe that is constantly splitting into innumerable parallel coexisting but 
non-interacting multiple universes? 
 
Even statistical mechanics is open to a wide range of interpretations.  Are its probabilities 
measures of actual frequencies of outcomes in “real ensembles?”  Or are they measures of 
rational expectation to be inferred from an inductive logic?  Is it “mixing” that grounds the 
approach to equilibrium, or is it, instead, the many degrees of freedom of the systems and their 
(sometimes) low densities?  Is the origin of temporal asymmetry to be found in an initial 
“improbable” smoothness of spacetime at the big bang?  Or does it arise instead out of some 
underlying time asymmetry of the dynamical laws of quantum mechanics? 
 
And so on. 
 
How can we ask our fundamental physical theories to tell us about what there is in the world 
when each of those theories is subject to multiple interpretations, interpretations that often 
radically disagree with one another about what kind of a world the fundamental theory is really 
describing? 
 
One natural suggestion is to try and eliminate this super-abundance of interpretations, not by 
adopting one or another of them, but, instead, by identifying the theory with “what all the 
interpretations have in common.”  Find the equivalence relation that makes them all 
interpretations of “one and the same theory,” and identify the theory as the equivalence class of 
all these interpretations generated by that relation. 
 
But that proposal always comes down to the same thing, as far as I can see.  It amounts to 
claiming that the theory is nothing but the set of lawlike generalizations true of the theory’s 
observational consequences.  And even thinking that this notion is comprehensible, that is that 
one can make sense of the notion of “all possible observational consequences” of a theory as 
distinct from the set of all its consequences in general, is to assume an enormous chunk of that 
very empiricism that was being derided as just one more obsolete first philosophy.  And to 
assume that it is legitimate to identify the theory with the set of such observational consequences, 
if such a set is a coherent notion, is again to make a philosophical commitment to one of the 
major themes of traditional empiricist and positivist thought. 
 
So if the naturalist is going to hold to the demand that the only legitimate metaphysics is that 
generated by what the fundamental theories of our best available science tells us constitutes the 
world, is this naturalist then going to be happy with the possibility that these theories leave this 
metaphysics in a radically under-determined state?  Not because of any of the sorts of trendy 
relativism about science that flow from some version of the sociology of knowledge or other, nor 
because of the possibility of trivial re-writings of the theories, but because of the persistence 
within fundamental physical science of a multiplicity of interpretations for our best available 
foundational physical theories. 
 
III. 
One challenge to naturalism, then, is that the necessity for interpreting fundamental physical 
theories makes it very dubious that any such theory “by itself” can tell us to what kind of world 
we are committed to as metaphysicians when we accept the theory as correct.  But there is 
another way in which the issue of interpretation within fundamental physical science casts doubt 
on the claims of the naturalist. 
 
When presented with the need to provide an interpretive understanding of  a foundational theory, 
what are some of the strategies employed within foundational science itself?  There are many 
such fundamental theories and they certainly differ from one another in a wide variety of ways.  
And the internal difficulties they confront are manifold as well.  So we expect that each 
“unhappy” theory will be unhappy in its own way and that each such theory will require an 
individualized therapy to bring it to some state of conceptual equilibrium.  In other words, 
interpretations will have to be custom designed for each problem case.  We cannot expect one 
program of “universal interpretation” to do justice to all of the cases of interpretive need that 
arise in foundational physics. 
 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that some common elements might be found that appear and 
reappear across a variety of interpretations for a variety of foundational theories.  Can we 
discover any such threads that weave through the fabric of interpretation?  I believe we can. 
 
One such thread, by no means the only one, is a general principle of “retreating to the local.”  
When confronted with empirical or conceptual difficulties in a fundamental theory a common 
proposal is to reconstruct the theory on a basis that relies only upon physical relations that can be 
construed as existing only “at a point” or “within a small region” and by avoiding as basic any 
physical relations that one must think of has having a “distant” or “global” nature.  Let us look at 
some examples of this “going to the local” as it appears across a variety of theoretical 
interpretations. 
 
When the null results of the round-trip experiments with light seemed to show that as far as 
experimental results “at a point” were concerned it looked as though the speed of light was the 
same in all directions in all inertial frames, Einstein responded with his famous critical 
examination of the notion of distant simultaneity.  Any attempt at discovering the “real” one-way 
speed of light in a laboratory frame required synchronizing clocks at a distance from one another.  
But this could not be done “directly.”  Only some process that restricted itself to determining 
physical relations locally could legitimately be used to determine when events at a distance from 
one another were to be taken as occurring “at the same time.”  In constructing the spatio-
temporal relations of one’s theory it is considered legitimate to take as fundamental and 
undefined the notion of two events being coincident, of occurring at the same place at the same 
time.  It is also implicitly viewed as legitimate taking continuity along any path in the spacetime 
that can be traversed by a material signal as fundamental and undefined.  But it is denied that it is 
legitimate to take as undefined either features of the spacetime structure itself (as opposed to 
features of the material occupants of the spacetime), or to take as undefined even relations 
among the material things, so long as those relations are “at a distance.”  The simultaneity of two 
distant events or the equal length of two rigid rods that are separated from one another cannot be 
used as primitives. 
 
It is within this framework that Einstein then goes on to propose a “definition” for distant 
simultaneity, a structure for the spacetime of the world, later formalized by Minkowski and 
called by his name, and a set of physical laws that would retain the traditional laws of 
electromagnetism, that would revise the older Newtonian dynamical principles, but that would 
retain the principle, true in the older dynamics and apparently false in the older understanding of 
electromagnetism, that all inertial reference frames are fully physically equivalent to one another. 
 
The idea that physical theories ought to be founded upon undefined notions only if those notions 
are properly “local” is also implicitly at the heart of Einstein’s second great physical theory of 
spacetime, the theory of general relativity.  That this is the case was not so apparent at the 
inception of the theory.  The theory arose out of an attempt to find a relativistically acceptable 
theory of gravitation.  Einstein’s initial motivations came primarily from noting the degree to 
which gravitational force was equivalent to viewing phenomena from the point of view of an 
accelerated reference frame, and from the desire to find a theory that would conform to Mach’s 
relationism.  That ideas of “going to the local” were playing a crucial role was only realized 
later. 
 
Faced with his discovery of the “hole” argument, the fact that the theory seemed to allow 
multiple possible curved spacetimes in a region devoid of non-gravitational mass-energy for a 
single fixed set of boundary conditions, Einstein worried that his theory failed, inappropriately, 
to be deterministic.  His way out was to show that the multiple solutions all led to the same 
intersections of paths of test particles and light rays outside the “hole” and to the same proper 
time measurements on clocks transported through the hole.  And, it could be argued, once again, 
that only these relationships among material test objects “at a point” counted as the physical facts 
the theory needed to save.  The multiple solutions to the equations could then be viewed as 
simply alternative representations of the true factual contents of the theory. 
 
Further reflection of the way in which the theory disposes of Newton’s gravitational field, and, at 
the same time disposes of Newton’s global inertial reference frames that had been preserved in 
the special theory of relativity, replacing these with locally determined “free fall” reference 
frames and accelerations determined relative to these, once again suggests that proper 
understanding of the theory requires an interpretive program that restricts attention to that which 
is locally determinable as that which constitutes the factual content of the theory. 
 
But it is not only in spacetime theories that we find such “retreats to the local” when interpretive 
problems arise.  The next examples I am going to give, however, are much more problematic 
than those which arise out of spacetime theories.  For one thing, the notion of “the local” is 
vaguer than the notion of pointlike spatio-temporal coincidence that keeps coming up in 
interpretations of relativistic spacetime theories.  For another, these interpretations are far from 
universally accepted as the right way to go about solving the interpretive problems with which 
they are designed to deal. 
 
Quantum field theory is supposed to provide the solution to scattering problems.  A group of 
particle thought of as “free,” as non-interacting, approach one another.  As their spatial 
separation diminishes they interact.  After a long time a group of outgoing particles, once again 
not interacting with one another, is seen.  Given the input particles, and their energy, spins and 
momenta, with what probabilities do which output particles emerge and with what energies, 
spins and momenta?  That is a typical scattering problem. 
 
Quantum field theory is usually based on a number of axioms.  Some of these embed the 
principles of quantum mechanics into the theory, and some the relativistic spacetime posits.  The 
problem is that in the standard older version of the theory, if one is not careful, it is possible to 
show that the only solutions consistent with the axioms are those in which the interaction is null.  
Only free particle solutions exist (Haag’s Theorem). 
 
There is more than one way to try and deal with the problem.  One way is to stop thinking of the 
particles long before and long after the interaction as really “free.”  Instead a subtler technique is 
invoked to try and say what is meant by the particles being asymptotically non-interacting (LSZ 
approach).  With this move the source of the problem that resulted in Haag’s Theorem is 
circumvented.  (Essentially the standard approach requires two “lowest energy states,” “vacuua,” 
whereas the axioms entail that there can only be one.) 
 
But a different, broader, approach finds the difficulties with the theory in its reliance upon 
physical quantities that can only be globally defined.  Even a single “particle” in quantum field 
theory is a global entity, a field with values at every spacetime point.  Perhaps, once again, the 
solution to the interpretive difficulty should be found in “going to the local.”  Out of this 
perspective comes  the “local algebraic approach” to quantum field theory.  Here the 
fundamental mathematical elements introduced are supposed to correspond representationally to 
things such as the responses of spatio-temporally limited “particle detectors.”  Elements 
representing the global, the old quantum fields, are eliminated. 
 
Were the local algebraic approach only of use in solving this one technical problem of quantum 
field theory, it wouldn’t get much attention.  It has, however, other, more profound uses as well.  
Even working in the flat spacetime of special relativity, quantum field theory can be shown to 
have some very puzzling consequences.  A quantity in the theory might be thought of a 
representing the total number of particles in the universe.  But it is a peculiarity of the theory that 
it seems to say that if an inertially moving observer declares the universe to be empty of 
particles, any accelerated observer will be forced to declare the universe populated by a non-null 
collection of particles with a specific probabilistic distribution of their energies. 
 
There are a number of ways of dealing with this puzzle.  One way is to declare the inertially 
moving observers “privileged,” and to account for the particle numbers imputed to the world by 
the accelerated observers as “mis-readings” of the world due to their motion.  Or one could take 
particle number to be relative to state of motion.  Indeed, one can show that the different particle 
numbers are “complementary observables” that bear a fascinating analogy to the 
“complementary” position and momentum of ordinary quantum mechanics.  But another 
alternative is to once again remark on the “global” nature of particle number as a feature of the 
world, and to try and reconstruct the theory in terms of only more local quantities.  From this 
perspective it is the responses of spatio-temporally local particle detectors carried by the 
observers that are the real elements of the theory’s concern.  It is the establishment of lawlike 
correlations among these detection probabilities that is, from this perspective, the goal of the 
theory.  Not surprisingly, once again it is the local algebraic formulation of the theory that is best 
suited to interpreting the theory in this manner. 
 
But it is when one moves to the problem of understanding quantum field theory and the 
underlying spacetime is taken to be the curved spacetime of general relativity, that the local 
algebraic approach truly come into its own.  Quantum field theory in curved spacetime is a way 
of bringing gravity into the quantum field theoretic picture.  It is only an intermediate step, since 
it still takes the spacetime itself as classical.  But it is, for example, the hybrid theory that allow 
us to do such things as attribute temperatures to black holes and to predict their quantum 
“evaporation.” 
 
In curved spacetimes, the particle number attributed to the world will vary from reference frame 
to reference frame.  Even distinct, freely falling observers will come up with different particle 
number attributions.  As usual there is more than one attitude one can take.  You can take particle 
number to be a relative property of the world.  You can eschew the notion of particles and the 
numbers of them as fundamental at all, focusing instead on the quantum field as the fundamental 
bit of global ontology.  Or you can, once again, go local.  Here, as before, the talk becomes that 
of particle detectors moving along locally construed spacetime paths.  It is the probabilities of 
responses of these detectors to particles of different kinds, energies, momenta and spins with 
which the theory is concerned, and the lawlike correlations among these quantities that are 
fundamental.  Once again it is the local algebraic approach to the theory that is ideal for 
reconstructing the theory in this vein. 
 
This interpretation by “going to the local” is far more problematic than those that are used to 
understand the spacetime theories.  For one thing, this interpretive move is far more 
controversial.  Many interpreters of quantum field theory reject this whole way of going about 
understanding the theory.  For another, the notion of what is “local” is harder to get a grip on 
than it is in the spacetime theory cases.  In the latter, it is coincidences of events “at a point” and 
continuity along paths in spacetime that can be traveled by material signals that are taken to be 
the “local” facts.  In the quantum field theoretic case it is detections by spatio-temporally limited 
detectors that are taken to be the local facts. 
 
Indeed, there are additional problems with quantum field theory that lead interpreters to deny 
that “local facts” in the strict sense can be legitimately dealt with by the theory.  That is to say, to 
avoid a number of other problems that the theory can run into, it is often suggested that values 
“at a spacetime point” be excluded from the domain of facts whose probabilities are to be 
predicted.  Instead quantities that result from “smearing” some pointlike value over a region are 
to be preferred as the “real physical facts” with which the theory is to deal. 
 
I am certainly not claiming that “going to the local” is the only move to make in interpreting a 
fundamental theory, nor that what “going to the local” means is a simple matter.  Even when it is 
invoked, its nature is highly dependent on the physical theory in question and on the interpretive 
puzzle to which the interpretive move of “going to the local” is responding. 
 
IV. 
 Despite the varying meanings “going to the local” can have in interpretive programs, and despite 
the varying purposes to which it is directed, can we find any general features that all of these 
interpretive problems have in common, and any general features of what it is about “going to the 
local” that is supposed to be helpful that cuts across the variations from case to case? 
 
In all of the cases of theory interpretation that rely upon “going to the local” a similar pattern 
emerges.  A theory is found to be unsatisfactory.  The failure of the theory is not one of simply 
predicting the wrong observational results.  Rather there is something “conceptually” defective 
in the theory.  The theory may have some wildly wrong prediction (that there is no interaction 
possible at all, say).  Or it may imply that one of its fundamental quantities is observationally 
indeterminate (the absolute velocity of the laboratory frame with respect to the aether, say, or the 
absolute value of a uniform gravitational field that is everywhere present).  Or the theory may 
deal in some quantity that is thought to be peculiar as a relativized quantity, but whose value is 
forced to be relational in the usual theoretical formulation (such as particle number in quantum 
field theory).  Or the theory may have a broad consequence that doesn’t seem appropriate to its 
description of the world (implying that the world is indeterministic when nothing in the theory 
seems to be real grounds for indeterminism, say). 
 
One desires to find a new “reformulation” of the theory, or a “reconstrual” of it, or just a new 
“interpretation” of it, that will retain the theory’s empirical and theoretical successes but that will 
avoid whatever in it gave rise to the conceptual difficulty the theory faced.  The suggestion often 
is to observe that the theory has many elements in its representational structure that go far 
beyond that directly necessitated by data or the data’s regularities.  Could it be that some (or 
much) of this representational structure is excessive?  Could it be that the source of the 
conceptual problems lies in a part of the representational structure that is otiose?  If that is so, 
perhaps the way to preserve the virtues of the theory and to rid it of its defects would be to “thin 
down” the representational structure of the theory, retaining what is needed but eliminating that 
which was excessive and which generated the conceptual anomalies. 
 
In the spacetime theories it is some part of the spacetime structure that must go.  In the quantum 
field theory case it may be particles (as they are construed in the theory) or, perhaps, the 
quantum field itself.  The parts of the representational structure that are suggested as eliminable 
are always those that dwell in the realm beyond that which deals with the predicted results of 
observations and experiments.  We don’t, after all, “see” the spacetime structure or “observe” the 
quantum field.  It is “epistemic remoteness” that is a necessary condition for being eligible for 
consideration as a part of the theory that could be possibly be dispensed with altogether, with the 
needed part of the theory being preserved. 
 
And it is here, of course, that “going to the local” plays its role.  In the spacetime theories it is 
taken for granted that the spacetime structure itself is not conceivably part of the “observable” 
realm dealt with by the theory.  Only the behavior of material things (moving particles, light 
rays, clocks, measuring rods) could possibly be taken as part of the observable structure of 
things.  And not even all relations among the material are observable.  Only those relations 
among the material things that are local can be taken as being among the observables.  So we can 
not only think of thinning down our theory by dispensing from it some of its posited spacetime 
structure, we can also contemplate with ease removing from it some posited relational structures 
among the material objects, so long as these relations are non-local.  Distant simultaneity is 
dispensable in framing the spacetime of special relativity, and, along with the gravitational field 
and the neo-Newtonian spacetime structure, global inertial motions are dispensable in framing 
general relativity. 
 
This suggestion, that the non-local relations among material things must be considered as being 
trapped in the realm of the in principle non-observable, pre-dated any of its really fruitful 
applications in the forming of the relativistic theories.  It was the centerpiece of Poincaré’s 
famous argument, dating back to the turn of the last century, to the effect that a choice among the 
Euclidean or axiomatic non-Euclidean geometries for describing the space of the physical world 
was purely a matter of “convention.”  But one need not accept the full brunt of Poincaré’s 
conventionalism to agree with him, at least implicitly, about the once-and-for-all non-
observability of non-local relations even among observable material things. 
 
Are the constructions of the modern spacetime theories, or at least their interpretations, founded, 
then, upon an implicit distinction between the observable and the non-observable entities and 
relations posited by theories?  Are they governed by an epistemically motivated preference for 
the observables as the items to be retained when, in dealing with conceptual anomalies, a theory 
is to be subjected to ontological “thinning out?” 
 
An interesting discussion of this issue is in Reichenbach’s Axiomatization of the Theory of 
Relativity dating back to the early 1920’s.  In the introduction to the book Reichenbach takes up 
the issue of using spacetime coincidence as a primitive in any formal reconstruction of the 
theory.  He argues there that this is not because coincidence is somehow a fact that is completely 
theory independent and knowable directly and perhaps with certainty?.  Those features could 
only hold of “subjective coincidence” and not of the physical, “objective coincidence” on which 
his formalization of relativity is based. 
 
Why, then, is coincidence the right primitive concept to employ?  It is because it “is justified by 
the consideration that objective coincidences are elementary facts…that remain invariant with 
respect to a great variety of interpretations.”  But this seems to put the cart quite decisively in 
front of the horse.  Isn’t it, rather, the case that we will count alternative accounts as 
interpretations of one and the same physical world only when they preserve all the predictive 
content of the theory in question with respect to spacetime coincidences?  And isn’t that demand 
based upon some epistemically motivated “theory independence,” or at least relative theory 
independence, of coincidence facts? 
 
To be fair to Reichenbach, it may be that he is only trying to avoid the suggestion that in basing 
the spacetime theory on local coincidences he is trying to found physics on “irrefutable facts” or 
on “totally theory independent concepts.”  Claims of objective coincidence may be fallible, like 
any other physical claims, and, he explicitly says, we may eventually reformulate physics 
without using the conceptual basis of objective coincidence at all.  But those claims would still 
be compatible with the view that it is the epistemic priority of coincidence claims over claims 
about spacetime structure itself or claims about non-local relations among material things, that 
gives even objective coincidence its special role in interpreting the theory.  It still is true though 
that the invariance of coincidence through many interpretations is a consequence of this assumed 
priority, and not the grounds for it. 
 
Without pursuing the details of the interpretations of quantum field theory, used as my other 
example of an interpretations that is based in part on ontological thinning out grounded on saving 
the local and dispensing with the global, I think it can safely be asserted that here too it is the 
assumption, often implicit and taken for granted but sometimes explicitly asserted, that the basis 
for the distinction between the two classes of concepts and the motivation for reconstructing the 
theory using only the local notions, is the epistemic priority of these features.  It is because we 
can dismiss the global aspects of the world as not open to experimental determination in the way 
in which the local aspects are, that when we come to reconstruct the theory, or to interpret it even 
if we leave its formal construction alone, we must use as our primitive concepts only those in the 
theory that characterize these local features of the world. 
 
V. 
 The interpretive practice of thinning the ontology of a theory by “going local” in moving to a 
more restrictive conceptual basis for the theory certainly bears elements in common with familiar 
empiricist philosophy.  Looking upon non-local concepts of the theory as dispensable, or as at 
best merely representational, will seem reminiscent of empiricist attempts to understand the role 
of material object concepts in a world whose fundamental entities are taken to be some kind of 
immediate content of experience.  One can dispose of them with Berkeley or treat them as some 
kind of instrumental “logical constructs” with the phenomenalists.  Distant simultaneity in 
special relativity, global inertial frames and gravitational fields in general relativity (and, 
perhaps, even the curved spacetime structure itself), global particles (and perhaps the quantum 
field itself) in quantum field theory, are all treated in various interpretations in the manner in 
which the not-immediately-perceivable gets treated in traditional empiricism. 
 
But, of course, as Reichenbach emphasized, there are grave differences as well between such 
interpretive schemes in foundational physics and traditional empiricism.  The “local” features 
held onto are still “physical” and “objective.”  There is no claim that they are truly knowable 
without any theoretical inference at all, or that knowledge of the facts involving them is in any 
way immune to empirical refutation or disconfirmation.  The local facts are only relatively 
“observational,” as opposed to the “merely inferred” global facts, in a particular context where a 
particular theory is being interpreted in order to deal with its specific conceptual anomalies. 
 
Nevertheless, the scent of “first philosophy” is in the air when these interpretive programs are 
being bruited in the scientific context. 
 
It may be suggested that the presence of such empiricist ways of thinking within science is just 
an indication of how scientists themselves may be influenced by philosophical trends from 
outside their true profession.  But this won’t do.  The interpretive moves that we have been 
talking about are made in response to genuine conceptual problems internal to foundational 
physical theories.  It is not idle philosophizing that motivates these interpretive constructions and 
reconstructions of theories, but existing internal problems of the theories themselves, problems 
that cry out for serious scientific solutions.  And it is not empiricist or positivist prejudice that 
leads some (or sometimes all) of the scientific community to accept one of these interpretations 
as the “correct” way of dealing with the conceptual anomaly in question.  It is, rather, the success 
of the interpretation in resolving the existing scientific dilemma that motivates its being absorbed 
into accepted science. 
 
The motivation of one of these interpretations is, then, scientific and the appraisal of the success 
of the interpretation is also a matter of scientific appraisal.  But what of the method of 
interpretation itself?  Is it “scientific” or is it “first philosophy?”  Or can any such distinction be 
drawn?  Certainly the basic structure - retreating from a richer to a leaner conceptual framework 
and choosing that framework by considerations grounded in epistemic accessibility – is one that 
is familiar from the critical arguments of empiricist and positivist programs.  But now it is such a 
program within science itself, and not the mere application of such a critique from an external, 
philosophically motivated perspective. 
 
Consider the following question:  Is it science itself that tells us that if we are to engage in such a 
program it should be structured by choosing as the legitimate conceptual elements to be retained 
those that are “local” in their nature?  Is it science that informs the scientists that the 
epistemically accessible is the local?  Or is that an a priori posit on their part?  I don’t know how 
to really answer such a question. 
 
Certainly it is true that within science we often use science to tell us about how the elements of 
the scientific theory are to be experimentally determined.  Einstein argued that no theory was 
“complete” unless it described its own observational procedures.  It is that sort of thinking that 
has led to frameworks for relativistic theories that rely on the motions of particles and light rays 
to fix the geometry rather than on clocks and measuring rods.  And it is the seeming inability of 
quantum theory to characterize classical measuring devices as required by Bohr, for example, 
that leads to some of the significant objections to his interpretive program. 
 
            Could it not be science that tells us that when we look for that which is empirically 
determinable we ought to look for the local facts dealt with by the theory?  Could we not imagine 
a world in which global facts were “directly” available to observation?  (Think of Newton is his 
unguarded Cambridge Platonist moment talking about infinite space as the “sensorium” of the 
Deity!  Could we not be as such a God?)  Here I tend to vacillate, sometimes thinking that the 
pragmatist could at least argue that fixing on the local as the observable was one more piece of 
bootstrapping within science that had no need of reliance on first philosophy, but at other times 
wondering if I can even imagine what a science could be like that wasn’t grounded 
observationally in the local. 
 
VI. 
It has been a theme of analytical pragmatists, then, that we can escape first philosophy, as least 
as far as metaphysics goes, by relying upon our best available foundational physical theories to 
tell us what there is in the world.  But, I have argued, these foundational theories remain silent 
about the basic contents of the world until they are understood or interpreted. 
 
To claim that interpretation is unnecessary since all the interpretations are merely versions of one 
and the same theory is, I have claimed, to resort implicitly to empiricist first philosophy, and a 
pretty rigid version of that indeed.  For only by such resort can we legitimately claim that there is 
some shared element that reveals what all the interpretations have in common.  That could only 
be their sum-total of observational consequences construed in some old-fashioned empiricist 
manner. 
 
But if we rely upon interpreted theories to give us our ontology, we must then ask how 
interpretation (in this sense) works.  I have argued that at least one common thread in many 
interpretations is the process of responding to conceptual difficulties with a theory by thinning its 
ontology.  This process is highly reminiscent of empiricist proposals to ground all assertion upon 
assertion about the observable alone.  In the case of the interpretations within science, the need 
for such ontological retrenchment is based not on general philosophical views about semantics 
and its relation to epistemology, but upon the desire to confront internal scientific puzzles with 
the theories.  And the acceptance of such reconstructions of theories is based on their scientific 
value in resolving the dilemmas with which the theory was originally confronted. 
 
Nevertheless, the general process itself is one that is familiar from empiricist or positivist 
philosophy. 
 
Within science the notion of “the observable” that is to be retained after the ontology of the 
theory has been pruned of otiose elements is often construed as the notion of “the local.”  
Empiricism within theorizing often amounts to eschewing global elements of the theory’s 
conceptual structure in favor of those elements referring to spacetime points or “small regions” 
alone. 
 
It is arguable, perhaps, that some aspects of this whole way of dealing with theories has some of 
its own justification arising out of science itself.  But that remains to be shown.  On the surface, 
at least, what goes on in such interpretive projects within foundational physics looks to be based 
as much on “first philosophical” presuppositions as was the empiricism the pragmatist wanted us 
to replace with “science itself.” 
 
Indeed, from this perspective we might think of grand philosophical empiricism in a new vein.  
Perhaps the notion of a once-and-for-all totally theory independent characterization of the 
“observation basis” and a once-and-for-all logical construction or instrumentalistic 
characterization of everything outside of that basis is a philosophers illusion.  But the process of 
“retreating to the observables” is one that is ongoing in a relative manner within the process 
inside of science of interpreting our foundational theories.  From this perspective grand 
philosophical empiricism may be viewed (in a Kantian manner?) as the ideal limit point of a 
legitimate scientific pursuit. 
 
Is that pursuit best characterized as internal science or “external” first philosophy?  I am not at 
all sure I know what the difference between these is supposed to be.  
